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INTRODUCTION
Over the past six years, the United States Supreme Court has
carved out a distinct jurisprudential approach to youth. In 2005,
the Court abolished the death penalty for juveniles in Roper v.
Simmons.1 Then the Court ruled that juveniles could no longer
be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for non2
homicide offenses in Graham v. Florida. Roper and Graham
changed the national conversation about the culpability of minors
who engage in criminal acts. As a result of these two cases,
which embraced the scientific evidence revealing fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds, juveniles can no
longer be classified among the worst offenders, deserving of the
most serious punishment.3 The magnitude of Roper and Graham
is equal in significance to the Supreme Court’s extension of due
process rights to children in the 1967 landmark case, In re
Gault. As important as Roper and Graham are in their own
right, collectively they pave the way for more meaningful due
process protections for children adjudicated in the criminal
justice system.4
One year after Graham, the Court handed down J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, completing what could be considered a trilogy
of Supreme Court cases that forge a new approach to youth
status in our justice system. For the first time, the Supreme
Court applied Roper, Graham, and recent adolescent
development research to a context other than the Eighth
Amendment.
In her majority opinion in J.D.B., Justice Sotomayor grasped
the significance of age in her common-sense approach to
1

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
3
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“No recent data provide reason to
reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of
juveniles . . . developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); Roper, 543
U.S. at 569 (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders.”).
4
See infra Part IV.
2
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Miranda custody determinations. J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old
student interrogated by a police detective in the principal’s office
of the boy’s middle school.5 As the Court noted, if it were to
ignore J.D.B.’s age in the custody analysis, as precedent
mandated, it would be forced to evaluate how a reasonable adult
would feel when removed from his seventh grade social studies
class, brought to the principal’s office, interrogated by a police
detective, and warned of detention in a juvenile facility if he
failed to cooperate.6 That makes little sense, as either a practical
or legal matter.
In J.D.B., the Court held that age is a relevant factor in
determining whether a juvenile is in custody for Miranda
purposes.7 Drawing from prior cases, including Roper and
Graham, both premised on the “understanding that the
differentiating characteristics of youth are universal,”8 a majority
of the Court agreed that failing to consider age in the custody
analysis would be nonsensical.9 Justice Sotomayor explained that
10
age is far more “than a chronological fact”; it informs behavior
and perception.11
Looking to the future, with the specific attributes of children
now firmly acknowledged in Supreme Court precedent, a
qualitatively different analysis is possible for juveniles in a
variety of contexts not yet considered by the Court. There are
any number of scenarios, from pre-trial to disposition, that may
5

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
Id. at 2407 (“[I]gnoring a juvenile defendant’s age will often make the
[Miranda] inquiry more artificial . . . .”).
7
Id. at 2399.
8
Id. at 2404.
9
Id. at 2405 (“Neither officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the
effect of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children
without accounting for the age of the child subjected to those
circumstances.”); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010)
(“A 16 year old and a 75 year old each sentenced to life without parole
receive the same punishment in name only.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005) (distinguishing juvenile and adult offenders based on age and
its implications).
10
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115 (1982)).
11
See id.
6
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require courts to approach the application of procedural and
substantive criminal law differently to youth in juvenile and
adult court proceedings. These include such matters as
competency, self-defense, lack of mens rea, accomplice liability,
voluntariness of waiver of rights, and suppression of physical
evidence.12 This Article will address three separate areas where
the Roper, Graham, J.D.B. trilogy may prove to have a
13
profound impact: waiver of right to counsel, Terry stops, and
the nature of the attorney-client relationship.14 In each of these
contexts, various attributes of youth have differing effects on the
doctrinal determination. For instance, if juveniles are
characteristically impetuous decision makers, they may require
additional protections to ensure that they are afforded a
meaningful opportunity to be represented by a lawyer.15
12

See Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme
Court Heralds the Emergence of the “Reasonable Juvenile” in American
Criminal Law, 89 CRIM. L. REP. 753, 753 (2011) (offering a fuller
discussion of how the Roper, Graham, J.D.B. trilogy opens the door to
replacing the “reasonable person” standard with a “reasonable child”
standard).
13
Terry-type detentions are brief detentions of civilians predicated on
reasonable and articulable suspicion. Police officers may stop and question a
civilian to confirm or dispel an officer’s suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
14
See infra Part IV.
15
The long-standing practice in some jurisdictions of children waiving
counsel at arraignment and proceeding pro se may be curtailed after J.D.B.
The most reliable way to ensure a juvenile is represented throughout the
proceedings is to impose a non-waivable right to counsel. See IRA M.
SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 160–61 (Lexington Books 1st prtg. ed. 1989) (“Nonwaivable right
to counsel is also important because of the research indicating that young
juveniles as a class do not understand the nature and significance of their
Miranda rights to remain silent and to counsel.”); Donna M. Bishop &
Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Development
Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 125, 127 (2007); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A
Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 994
(1995) (citing ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS., MINN.
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 5–11 (1994) (“The Study Committee
recommended mandatory, non-waivable appointment of counsel for juveniles
charged with felony or gross misdemeanor offenses, and in any proceeding
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Likewise, considering age when assessing the reasonableness of
whether a juvenile would feel free to terminate the encounter
during a Terry stop may compel a different outcome after J.D.B.
Finally, a juvenile’s difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences against short-term gains could put him or her at a
significant disadvantage in terms of the quality of the
representation he or she receives.16 Though the extent of
J.D.B.’s impact is currently unknowable, it has great potential to
ensure a meaningful delivery of constitutional protections to
children in the investigative and adjudicatory phases of
proceedings. Before exploring these possibilities in greater
depth, Part I of this article briefly traces Supreme Court
treatment of age of the suspect in Miranda custody
determinations. Part II in turn discusses Roper and Graham and
the foundation those decisions laid for construing age as an
objective factor in the custody analysis. Part III addresses the
relevance of juvenile cognitive and social functioning in
custodial interrogations. Finally, Part IV addresses the potential
for applying other constitutional rights afforded to juveniles in a
manner inclusive of age and psychosocial development, as
demonstrated by J.D.B.
I. THE ABSENCE OF AGE AS A FACTOR IN THE SUPREME COURT’S
CUSTODY ANALYSIS
Before J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court had not
definitively decided whether age is relevant in determining
whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. In 1966,
the year Miranda was decided, the Court did not contemplate
the implications of its holding for juveniles because Fifth
Amendment protections were not extended to juveniles until a
17
year later, in the landmark case of In re Gault. The Miranda
custody analysis was consequently predicated upon the
presumption that a reasonable adult would be the subject of

that may lead to out-of-home placement.”)).
16
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
17
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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interrogation,18 and the Court mandated consideration of
whether, in light of the police conduct, a “reasonable person” in
the suspect’s position would feel “at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.”19 The inquiry requires courts to
20
examine objective factors present during the interrogation in
order to avoid the unworkable task of requiring police to assess
how a suspect’s unique personality traits may have affected his
or her subjective state of mind.21 Although courts take into
account the age of a suspect when assessing the voluntariness of
statements and waiver of right against self-incrimination, age
was not historically considered in the context of the Miranda
custody analysis.22
The Court came close to considering the relevance of age in
assessing custody in Yarborough v. Alvarado.23 Michael
Alvarado was seventeen and one half years old, with no criminal
record.24 He was suspected of being involved in an attempted
robbery and murder with another boy who was believed to be
the shooter.25 Approximately one month following the shooting,
18

See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
19
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
20
These include:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that
the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or
request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered
under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom
of movement during the questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated
contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official request
to respond to questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive
stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the
atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether
the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the
questioning.
See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990).
21
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (citing
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1984)).
22
See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
23
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
24
Id. at 656, 660.
25
Id. at 656.
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upon the request of police, Alvarado’s parents brought him to
the police station.26 Without his parents present, police
questioned him for two hours about an attempted robbery and
murder.27 After initial denials, Alvarado eventually admitted that
he was present and that he helped to hide the gun after the
shooting.28 The police never gave Alvarado Miranda warnings.29
The trial court found he was not in custody and convicted him
30
of first degree murder. The State appeals court affirmed the
lack of custody determination.31
Alvarado filed a habeas corpus petition in which he claimed
he was being held pursuant to a state court judgment predicated
upon an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.32 When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
custody issue presented in Alvarado, it endorsed a requirement
for extra procedural safeguards when a juvenile is the subject of
a police interrogation.33 It reasoned that, if a youth, by virtue of
age and immaturity, is more susceptible to police coercion
during a custodial interrogation, he is also more likely to believe
that he is in custody in the first place.34 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
Because the issue reached the Supreme Court in the context
of a habeas proceeding, the Court applied the deferential
standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), rather than review de
novo whether Alvarado was in custody.35 The Court addressed
the limited issue of whether the state court unreasonably applied
clearly established law when it held that Alvarado was not in
26

Id.
Id.
28
Id. at 657.
29
Id. at 656.
30
Id. at 658.
31
People v. Soto, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
32
Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 655.
33
Id. at 660 (citing Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir.
2002)).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 655 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006)).
27
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custody.36 Because of the absence of Supreme Court precedent
regarding age as a relevant factor in custody determinations, the
Court ruled that the state trial court did not err when it denied
consideration of age in its determination that Michael Alvarado
37
was not in custody. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
reaffirmed the Court’s long-standing adherence to an objective
custody test under Miranda.38
Importantly, Alvarado did not foreclose consideration of age
in the custody analysis; it merely held that such consideration is
not a matter of clearly established federal law.39 Nonetheless, the
decision caused some state courts to retreat from considering a
suspect’s age when evaluating whether that juvenile was in
custody. For instance, Iowa and Illinois, which had historically
used age as a factor in considering whether a juvenile was in
custody and thus deserving of Miranda warnings, ceased that
practice in response to Alvarado.40 Similarly, states such as
Wyoming, the District of Columbia, and North Carolina that
had not previously decided whether age was a relevant
consideration in custody determinations foreclosed consideration
of age following Alvarado.41
36

Id. at 655; see also § 2254(d)(1).
Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668. Justice O’Connor was the swing vote. In
her concurrence, she recognized that there may be instances where age
should be a factor, but not in this case because Michael was merely six
months shy of his eighteenth birthday. Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
38
Id. at 668 (majority opinion).
39
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011) (“Our prior
decision in Alvarado in no way undermines these conclusions . . . . [W]e
observed that accounting for a juvenile’s age in the Miranda custody analysis
‘could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.’ We said nothing,
however, of whether such a view would be correct under the law.” (citations
omitted) (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668)).
40
See People v. Croom, 883 N.E.2d 681, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(“Given the . . . emphasis on objectiveness [in Alvarado], we decline to
consider defendant’s age [sixteen] when determining whether he was in
custody . . . .”); State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 681 n.1 (Iowa 2009)
(“Previously, we . . . use[d] age as part of the analysis in determining a
defendant’s custodial status. However, subsequent[ly] . . . the Supreme Court
decided Yarborough v. Alvarado, which questions whether age is a factor to
consider under a federal constitutional analysis.” (citations omitted)).
41
See In re J.F., 987 A.2d 1168, 1175–76 (D.C. 2010) (declining to
37
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In retrospect, it would have been premature for the Alvarado
Court to reach the issue of whether age should be considered in
determining whether a juvenile suspect is in custody. Because
Michael Alvarado was almost an adult at seventeen and one half
years old,42 the case did not present an ideal set of facts to
encourage the Court to delve into the frailties and vulnerabilities
of adolescence. Furthermore, the legal recognition that children
are categorically different from adults did not exist at the time of
Alvarado. Although the law treated youth differently from adults
in some contexts,43 the foundation for recognizing the
neurological and psychological differences between adolescents
and adults in the criminal context was not laid until Roper v.
Simmons.44 Roper was the first of a progression of cases relying
on the age of the juvenile offender as grounds for a distinct
approach toward the application of constitutional protections.
Then, in Graham v. Florida, Justice Kennedy elaborated on the
universal differences between children and adults.45

consider the age of J.F., a fourteen-year-old, because “the Supreme Court
has not held that a suspect’s age . . . is relevant to the Miranda custody
analysis,” and instead, considering that he “was never told that he was
required to speak with the officers, he was not handcuffed, and he traveled to
the station in an unmarked car with plainclothes officers” to determine that he
was not in custody); In re W.R., 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (N.C. 2009) (applying
the objective “reasonable person” standard to conclude that the fourteen-yearold defendant was not in custody at the time of questioning while not
considering the age of the juvenile); C.S.C. v. State, 118 P.3d 970, 978
(Wyo. 2005) (holding that the age of a sixteen-year-old student suspect need
not be considered in custody inquiry where the student was repeatedly told
that he was not under arrest, was not obligated to answer questions, and
could leave at any time).
42
Alvarado, 541 U.S at 656.
43
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (“If the
actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid
being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and
experience under like circumstances.”). Military service is another example
where the law treats youth differently than adults. See generally Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–73 (2006).
44
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
45
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ROPER AND GRAHAM TO JUVENILES
Roper and Graham are the keys to understanding Justice
Kennedy’s vision of childhood and the distinct qualities of
46
children that differentiate them from adults. Quite possibly, the
5-4 ruling in J.D.B. would have been different had the case
been decided prior to Roper. Attaining majority in J.D.B. likely
depended on Justice Kennedy’s vote, which no doubt influenced
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion. Indeed, Kennedy’s opinions in
Roper and Graham announced a jurisprudential approach to
youth predicated on the belief that there are characteristics
unique to juveniles that render them categorically distinct from
adults.47 Both decisions follow a logical progression in terms of
explaining how the biological and psychosocial development of
youth can mitigate their culpability. The cases reveal evidence of
Kennedy’s views on the objectivity of age.
A. Roper v. Simmons
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for persons under the
age of eighteen, and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.48 The decision
46

See Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s Vision
of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 66,
69–74 (2010).
47
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting that children “are more vulnerable
or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” than adults); see also Graham, 130
S. Ct. at 2026 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s
observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici
point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”).
48
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. Christopher Simmons proposed and
committed burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim,
and throwing the victim off a bridge with the help of friends. Id. at 555–58.
Simmons was sentenced to death at the age of seventeen. Id. at 558. The
United States Supreme Court found that the execution of minors violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” as applied
to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 578–79.
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established that, as a categorical matter, juveniles are less
culpable than adults and thus less deserving of the most severe
punishment.49 The Court relied on social science research and
common life experience in declaring the presence of “signature
50
qualities of youth” to support its abolition of the death penalty
for juveniles. The majority, therefore, held the view that age
renders certain characteristics salient regardless of the particular
idiosyncrasies of an individual child. Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion in J.D.B. six years later reflects this sentiment:
A child’s age, however, is different. Precisely because
childhood yields objective conclusions like those we have
drawn ourselves—among others, that children are “most
susceptible to influence,” and “outside pressures”—
considering age in the custody analysis in no way
involves a determination of how youth “subjectively
affect[s] the mindset” of any particular child.51
The first of these three salient characteristics is “[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . found
52
in youth more often than in adults . . . .” The Court noted that
“[t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.”53 “In recognition of the comparative
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State
prohibits those who are under 18 years of age from voting,
serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”54 The
second characteristic is the fact that “juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure”55 which the Court noted “is
49

Id. at 568–70.
Id. at 570 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).
51
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404–05 (2011) (alteration
in original) (citations omitted).
52
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53
Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54
Id.
55
Id. (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence . . . .”
(alteration in the original) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
50
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explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles
have less control, or less experience with control, over their
own environment.”56 Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of
57
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”
The Court reasoned that, juvenile offenders, by virtue of
these characteristics, are significantly less culpable than adults,
even those who commit heinous acts of murder.58 To illustrate
that the Court views these traits as universal, when pressed to
reject a per se rule in favor of a case-by-case assessment of an
individual defendant’s psychological and social maturity, the
Court responded that “[t]he differences between juvenile and
adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability.”59
B. Graham v. Florida
Five years after Roper v. Simmons, the Court considered
whether sentencing persons who committed non-homicide
offenses before age eighteen to a life sentence without the
possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment. Relying
heavily on Roper, Graham v. Florida answered that question in
the affirmative, protecting an entire class of offenders from
receiving determinate life sentences.60 In the majority opinion,
once again led by Justice Kennedy, the Court observed that a
life without parole sentence and a death sentence share defining
characteristics—the denial of all hope and certainty that
61
redemption will not change one’s mortal fate or destiny. For
instance, the Court observed that, even if a state does not
(1982))).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 570.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 572–73.
60
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence
on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide”).
61
Id. at 2027.
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execute an offender, life without parole is an irrevocable
forfeiture of the duration of one’s life.62 The Court found that
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole was unusually harsh
because it denied the youth any chance for redemption.63
Once again, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found
that specific immutable characteristics of youth require their
categorical exclusion from a particular punishment.64 Graham v.
Florida bolsters Roper’s findings about youth by acknowledging
that scientific research has furthered our understanding of the
cognitive differences (variations in reasoning and understanding)
and psychosocial differences (disparities in social and emotional
functioning) between juveniles and adults.65 Graham is a logical
extension of Justice Kennedy’s approach in Roper, finding that
the well-documented and understood traits of adolescence
66
mitigate a youth’s culpability. In other words, by virtue of age
alone, a juvenile’s culpability cannot be equal to that of an
adult.67 Graham carries Roper’s rationale regarding the general
62

See id. at 2028 (“[If sentenced to life without parole], a juvenile
offender will on average serve more years of his life in prison than an adult
offender.”).
63
Id. at 2028–30. Graham, who was sixteen years old at the time of the
first offense, received probation after a plea deal for attempting to rob a
restaurant with friends. Id. at 2018. While on probation for that offense, he
was later arrested again. Id. The court gave him the maximum possible
sentence for violating his probation by committing a home invasion robbery,
possessing a firearm, and associating with persons engaged in criminal
activity. Id. at 2020. Graham was given life without parole. Id.
64
Id. at 2026 (“Juveniles are more capable of change than are
adults . . . .”).
65
Id. Though cognitive abilities vary widely among individuals, legal
precedent has accepted the well-established social science research that
children process information differently than adults, and their judgments and
perceptions reflect orientations associated with adolescence. See Steinberg, L.
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minor’s Access to Abortion,
the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583–97 (2009); see also Bishop & Farber, supra note 15, at
149 (citing Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160–64 (1997)).
66
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27.
67
Id. at 2027 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished
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character of a juvenile’s psychosocial immaturity and cognitive
abilities68 a step further by articulating additional distinctions
between adults and juveniles in the context of the penological
goals. Graham points out that because of a juvenile’s “limited
understanding of the criminal justice system,” their “mistrust
[of] adults,” and their tendency toward impulsive decision
making, “they are less likely . . . to work effectively with their
lawyers to aid in their own defense.”69
Society is replete with laws that disqualify a minor from
engaging in particular conduct because of the unique
vulnerabilities of children. For instance, there are laws that
restrict children from marrying,70 entering into binding
contracts,71 possessing alcohol,72 and serving in the armed
forces,73 to name just a few.74 Once a child reaches the age of
majority, the justification for these protections becomes obsolete,
because they rest on the objective characteristics of childhood.
While there may be some children whose capacity to negotiate a
moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each
bear on the analysis.”).
68
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
69
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
70
Brief for Am. Ass’n of Jewish Lawyers & Jurists et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412),
2009 WL 2236776, at *9 (“All fifty states have established minimum age
requirements to vote, marry, join the military, obtain a driver’s license, and
consume alcohol.”).
71
Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968)
(“The law governing agreements made during infancy reaches back over
many centuries. The general rule is that ‘the contract of a minor, other than
for necessaries, is either void or voidable at his option.’” (citations omitted)
(quoting Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 126 N.W. 50, 52 (Wis.
1910))).
72
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-84 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (2010).
73
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3 (2011); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 1805/1 (2011); N.Y. MIL. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1990).
74
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011)
(“[L]imits on children’s legal capacity under the common law ‘secure them
from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts.’” (quoting 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 464–65
(Oxford, Claredon Press 1765)).
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contract or perform in military operations would exceed that of
an adult, society nonetheless assigns prohibitions according to
age—an objective factor that applies evenly to every minor
regardless of her skill level or precociousness.
The relevance of social norms and legal standards based on
minority played an important role in the Court’s decisions
regarding whether juveniles can be subject to the most severe
punishments.75 In Roper and Graham, the Court considered the
appropriateness of the death penalty and life without parole,
respectively, for non-homicide offenses committed by minors.76
The stark contrast between prohibiting a minor from marrying
due to his immaturity, but subjecting him to the death penalty
despite his age, underscores a paradox present in our criminal
justice system.77 In part, the abolition of the death penalty and
life without parole is recognition that characteristics of youth are
universal. Specifically, because laws disqualify children, as a
class, from certain activities based on the belief that they lack
mature judgment, it follows that they should be protected from
the harshest criminal sanctions.78
III. ROPER AND GRAHAM EXTEND BEYOND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT CONTEXT
Roper and Graham have had a profound impact on Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, and both of these decisions have
contributed greatly to the field of juvenile justice. Many scholars
have written about the application of Roper and Graham to areas

75

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70 (2005).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70; Brief for American Ass’n of Jewish
Lawyers & Jurists et al., supra note 70, at *9–14.
77
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. Almost every state has laws that
distinguish youth from adults “[i]n recognition of the comparative immaturity
and irresponsibility of juveniles.” Id. The distinction made by states is among
several factors demonstrating “that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability
be classified among the worst offenders” for which the death penalty is
reserved. Id. at 553.
78
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper, 543
U.S. at 568–70.
76
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of jurisprudence other than the Eighth Amendment.79
Practitioners and academics alike have recognized that Roper
and Graham constitute a new jurisprudential approach that
accounts for the uniqueness of youth in protecting and delivering
constitutional rights to juveniles. Collectively, Roper and
Graham are evidence that the current Supreme Court is
committed to ensuring that “youth” is treated as a mitigating
80
rather than an aggravating factor. The Court’s recognition of a
juvenile’s psychosocial immaturity and cognitive functioning as
it relates to punishment left open the question of whether these
same findings would be equally relevant to other constitutional
protections. J.D.B. answered that question in the context of
police interrogation.
A. J.D.B. v. North Carolina
In 2005, a police detective from the Chapel Hill, North
Carolina Police Department arrived at Smith Middle School to
79

See Bishop & Farber, supra note 15; Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile
Justice Reform 2.0, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 79 (2011) [hereinafter Birckhead,
Juvenile Justice] (“[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions ending the juvenile
death penalty and juvenile life without parole sentences for non-homicides,
and holding that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis,
could lead to significant change in both the juvenile and criminal justice
systems for young offenders.”); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child:
Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
385, 386 (2008) (“[T]he principal bases of Simmons [should] be applied to
the area of juvenile interrogation.”); Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1094
n.169 (2011) (citing Roper and Graham to show that the court recognizes
fundamental differences between adults and children, and may recognize that
children and adult generations currently have different expectations of
privacy); Levick, supra note 12; Elizabeth Locker, Grow Up Georgia . . . It's
Time to Treat Our Children As Children, 4 J. MARSHALL L.J. 85, 87 (2011)
(citing Roper and Graham to advocate for juvenile delinquency jurisdiction
for all persons under eighteen, regardless of the crime). Currently, “Georgia
law generally limits delinquency jurisdiction to children under seventeen and
further identifies seven felonies that, if a child as young as thirteen is alleged
to have committed, are excluded from original juvenile court jurisdiction.”
Id.
80
See Birckhead, supra note 46, at 79.
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interview a student about a stolen digital camera.81 The camera
was found in the school and was one of several items stolen
from two recent residential break-ins.82 The detective believed
that J.D.B., a 13 year old special education student in the
83
seventh grade, had stolen the camera from a neighbor’s house.
A school police officer escorted J.D.B. from his classroom to a
conference room where he was met by the assistant principal,
her assistant, and the juvenile detective doing the investigation.84
After J.D.B. entered the conference room, the door was
closed behind him.85 In the presence of the administrators, the
detective asked J.D.B. to explain where he had been at the time
that the break-ins occurred.86 J.D.B. confirmed that he was in
the neighborhood then, but informed the police that he had been
looking for work.87 The detective pressed J.D.B. further and
88
pulled out the stolen camera. Eventually, J.D.B. confessed to
breaking into his neighbor’s house and stealing the camera.89 He
wrote a full statement detailing the theft.90 By this time, roughly
forty-five minutes had passed since the interrogation had
begun.91
Except for one statement encouraging J.D.B. to tell the
truth, the school administrators were present but silent
throughout the interrogation.92 Instead, the police detective
conducted all the questioning.93 J.D.B’s grandmother, his legal
94
guardian, was not notified about the questioning. It was only
after J.D.B. admitted to stealing the camera that the detective
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2400.
Id.
Id. at 2399.
Id.
See id. 2399–400.
Id. at 2399.
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told him he did not have to speak to him and that he was free to
leave.95 However, no Miranda warnings were given.96
The detective used the confession and the written statement
to obtain a search warrant for J.D.B.’s home.97 After police
retrieved the other stolen items, they ultimately charged J.D.B.
with one count of breaking and entering and one count of
larceny.98 The trial court denied J.D.B’s motion to suppress his
statements made during the interrogation, saying that his
statements were voluntary and that he was not in custody, and
the intermediate appellate court affirmed.99 The North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld both the trial court decision and the
intermediate appellate court.100 The Court rested its finding on
the characteristics of the school environment as generally
restrictive in regard to all students, and therefore the
interrogation was not satisfactorily custodial to meet the purpose
101
The North
for which Miranda warnings were designed.
Carolina Supreme Court’s reasoning would make it virtually
impossible for a judge to find that a student interrogated in a
school setting is ever in custody for purposes of Miranda.
B. Roper and Graham Meet Miranda
J.D.B. v. North Carolina approached the question of age and
its relevance to the Miranda custody analysis relying on past
precedent, social science, and common sense.102 As Justice
Sotomayor opined, common sense conclusions about behavior

95

Id. at 2400.
Id. at 2399.
97
See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136–37 (N.C. 2009), rev’d sub
nom., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
98
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400.
99
Id.
100
In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136.
101
Id. at 138 (“The uniquely structured nature of the school environment
inherently deprives students of some freedom of action. However, the typical
restrictions of the school setting apply to all students and do not constitute a
“significant” deprivation of freedom of action . . . .”).
102
See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2394.
96
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and perception may be based upon age.103 One need not possess
a degree in child development to appreciate that children behave
and perceive events differently from adults.104
It is no coincidence then that the J.D.B. Court began its
explanation of the relevance of age to the Miranda custody test
with a recitation of cases affirming the inherently coercive
atmosphere of an interrogation.105 The test for custody under
Miranda limits itself to consideration of objective circumstances
in determining how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position
would understand his freedom to end the questioning and
106
leave. Relying upon the general characteristics of children, the
Court found that police officers and judges can consider age
without “doing any damage to the objective nature of the
custody analysis.”107 As Miranda recognized, “the very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty
and trades on the weakness of individuals,”108 and weaknesses
could not be more evident than in children.
J.D.B. is replete with references to Roper and Graham,
among other cases, to explain why age is relevant to the
Miranda custody analysis. Specifically, the Court noted that a
juvenile’s susceptibility and vulnerability to external pressures is
equally relevant to a child’s perception of whether he is free to
terminate the interrogation, and that coercive interrogation
techniques used on children increase the potential for false
confessions.109 Borrowing from Roper, Graham, and other
Supreme Court precedent, the Court explained that a reasonable
child subjected to police questioning would sometimes feel
pressured to submit when his or her adult counterpart would

103

Id. at 2407.
Id.
105
Id. at 2401 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435
(2000); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
106
Id. at 2402 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
107
Id. at 2403.
108
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
109
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401 (citing Steven A. Drizin & Richard A.
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post–DNA World, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 891, 906–07 (2004)).
104
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not.110 In light of a child’s deference to authority, a juvenile
suspect is likely to feel he must comply with a police officer’s
request to talk to him, especially where he is surrounded by
school personnel in the principal’s office.111 For instance, a child
in a situation like J.D.B.’s would almost certainly perceive his
circumstances differently from how an adult in the same
situation might. As the J.D.B. Court noted,
[t]he effect of the schoolhouse cannot be disentangled
from the identity of the person questioned. A student—
whose presence at school is compulsory and whose
disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action—is
in a far different position than say, a parent volunteer on
school grounds to chaperone an event, or an adult from
the community on school grounds to attend a basketball
game. Without asking whether the person “questioned in
school” is a “minor,” . . . the coercive effect of the
schoolhouse setting is unknowable.112
Likewise, scientific findings about the adolescent tendency to
emphasize short-term gains while minimizing long-term
consequences113 provide insight into a juvenile suspect’s decision
to cooperate with police and submit to an interrogation. Some
youth are likely to submit to questioning for the purpose of
fulfilling a desire to go home, even if that results in detention,
110

Id. at 2403 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325
(1994)).
111
Id. at 2405.
112
Id.
113
See Christine Holdeman et al., Roper v. Simmons the Death Penalty
Was Banned for Juvenile Offenders, 35 LINCOLN L. REV. 43, 79 (2008)
(discussing how scientists have shown that while adolescents perform costbenefit analyses, they skew this balance by emphasizing short-term results
and discounting future consequences more than adults do); Elizabeth S.
Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 233 (1995) (discussing research that indicates
developmental influences lead youthful decision makers and adults to differ in
“the subjective value they attach to various perceived consequences in the
process of making choices . . . .”); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age
Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV.
28–44 (2009) (researchers found differences in future orientation and the
ability to delay rewards among adolescents of various ages as well as adults).

J.D.B. v. North Carolina

137

rather than invoking their rights out of concern for their best
legal interests.114 At first blush, this may seem applicable only to
the waiver of Miranda rights, but in fact a youth’s tendency
toward impetuous decision making for short term gratification
may permit police to rely on less authoritative conduct to
achieve compliance, which is relevant to the custody inquiry.
The characteristics unique to adolescent brain development and
psychosocial development make a juvenile’s perception of a
restraint on his freedom fundamentally distinct from an adult’s
perception of that restraint. As Sotomayor explained, “[n]either
officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of
objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to
children without accounting for the age of the child . . . .”115
These truths are self-evident and draw their source from
normative experiences—whether it be childhood or parenthood,
or perhaps both.116
In both Graham and J.D.B., the government argued for
alternatives that would deny adolescents different protections.
The government, in Graham, argued that because states,
including Florida, account for a juvenile offender’s age when
determining whether to prosecute in adult criminal court or in
juvenile court, there is no need to exclude juveniles from life
without parole sentences categorically.117 The government
114

See Saul M. Kassin & Gisli Gudjonsson, The Psychology of
Confessions: A Review of the Literature and the Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PUB. INT. 33, 52 (2004) (citing to a 1981 study that found most juveniles
who waived their Miranda rights did so because they wanted to be released);
see also Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study
Calls Competency into Question, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Fall 2003, at 20, 23
(discussing findings that adolescents are more willing than adults to confess,
“especially if they believe it will result in . . . going home.”).
115
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405.
116
See id. at 2407 (“[A] child’s age, when known or apparent, is hardly
an obscure factor to assess. . . . [O]fficers and judges need no imaginative
powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive
science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a
child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a 7–year–old
is not a 13–year–old and neither is an adult.”).
117
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (“[T]he State
argues that the laws of Florida and other States governing criminal procedure
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contended that a state’s sentencing discretion was ample to
ensure fair sentencing procedure.118 The Graham Court held
otherwise, echoing its reasoning in Roper that the differences
between juveniles and adults are so “marked and well
understood” that they require a categorical rule that a juvenile
cannot be sentenced to life without parole.119
In J.D.B., the government argued that because a suspect’s
age is considered under the voluntariness test of the Due Process
Clause, age is adequately accounted for when considering the
admissibility of the defendant’s statement.120 Just as the Graham
Court rejected the state’s charging scheme argument, the J.D.B.
Court rejected efforts to keep age out of the Miranda custody
analysis.121 Both Graham and J.D.B. reject alternatives to noncategorical rules about age when the result has the potential to
undermine the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles.122
Both decisions find that age is relevant to ensure adherence to
separate, but equally important, constitutional considerations.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF J.D.B. FOR SECURING MEANINGFUL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS FOR JUVENILES
When children are held to a “reasonable adult standard” to
assess whether their constitutional rights were violated, they are
denied adequate protection under the law. To ignore the real
differences between adults and children fails to ensure the
procedural safeguards Gault intended. A child’s constitutional

take sufficient account of the age of a juvenile offender.”).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 2032.
120
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408.
121
Id. at 2406 (“The State and its amici offer numerous reasons that
courts must blind themselves to a juvenile defendant’s age. None is
persuasive.”).
122
See Birckhead, supra note 46, at 71 (“In both opinions [Roper and
Graham] Justice Kennedy concluded that a case-by-case approach could not
reliably separate out those juveniles with the capacity for change; only a
categorical rule that drew a bright line between childhood and adulthood was
sufficient to avoid the imposition of punishment disproportionate to the
crime.”).
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rights should be delivered and protected in ways commensurate
with the well-settled understanding about characteristics of
youth.123 J.D.B., the latest case in the developing body of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on youth status, has the potential
to reshape the way the law secures constitutional rights for
juveniles. The Court distinguished age from “other personal
characteristics that, even when known to police, have no
objectively discernible relationship to a reasonable person’s
understanding of his freedom of action.”124 Future cases will
determine whether the standard being applied adequately
accounts for the immutable characteristics of youth.
Scholars will opine on the various ramifications of J.D.B.
over the coming months and perhaps years. Although the
breadth and depth of that subject is beyond the scope of this
Article, this Part sketches a few areas of juvenile justice that are
ripe for reconsideration after J.D.B. Specifically, waiver of right
to counsel, Terry stops of juveniles, and the attorney-client
relationship are areas in which an adolescent’s normal
developmental impairments may dictate a different analytical
framework in which to evaluate whether children are being
provided the full scope of procedural safeguards to which they
are entitled.
In the wake of Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the deleterious
practice of children waiving counsel at arraignment and
proceeding pro se should be curtailed. Research indicates that
waiver of counsel is significantly higher among juveniles than
125
adults. The well-founded belief that a juvenile’s lack of

123

Roper, Graham and J.D.B. affirm the fundamental differences
between adults and children and pave the way for juvenile and criminal
justice reform. See Birckhead, Juvenile Justice, supra note 79, at 19–20
(discussing the extent and limitations of the juvenile justice reforms these
decisions could facilitate); see also Emily Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and
What Lawyers and Judges Can Do About It, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318,
332 (2011) (discussing how proposed dramatic juvenile justice reform would
not require a substantial change in the law or policy of the juvenile court).
124
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404.
125
See Hillary B. Farber, Do You Swear to Tell the Truth, the Whole
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth Against Your Child?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
551, 570 n.95 (2010).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

140

maturity and sense of responsibility causes him or her to make
impetuous and ill-considered decisions is equally relevant to
challenging the validity of a juvenile’s uncounseled waiver of
representation. A child’s lack of appreciation for long term
consequences impairs his or her ability to make sound decisions
regarding legal strategy, perhaps most significant is the waiver
of one’s right to counsel. A 2006 study by the National Juvenile
Defender Center estimates that up to seventy-five percent of
juveniles in some counties in Florida waive their right to counsel
in delinquency proceedings.126 Other states such as Virginia,
Ohio, and Georgia had waiver of counsel rates as high as fifty to
ninety percent in certain counties.127
The “commonsense conclusions about behavior and
perception”128 that the Court categorically applied to youth in
J.D.B. are equally applicable in the Fourth Amendment context.
Accordingly, the legal rubric used to assess a Terry stop of a
juvenile is ripe for reconsideration after J.D.B. Under Terry and
its progeny, not every police encounter with a civilian implicates

126

See PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT’L JUVENILE
DEFENDER CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL &
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 27–28 (2006),
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf.
127
See AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., GEORGIA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 1 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2001), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf (in some jurisdictions, up to ninety
percent of children waive the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings);
AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO 25 (Kim Brooks et al. eds., 2003),
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pdf (up to eighty
percent waiver rate in some jurisdictions); AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE
CTR. ET AL., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 23 (Patricia
Puritz et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia%
20Assessment.pdf (more than fifty percent waived the right to counsel in one
jurisdiction); PURITZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 126 (up to seventy-five
percent waive the right to counsel in some Florida jurisdictions).
128
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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the Fourth Amendment.129 Police officers may question civilians
without the encounter amounting to a “seizure” if a reasonable
person in that situation would feel he was free to walk away.130
Thus, in such instances, an individual’s participation is viewed
as consensual. However, that same police-civilian encounter will
implicate the Fourth Amendment if a reasonable person would
not feel free to leave.”131 The fact that adults and children
perceive their relationship with authority differently is well
settled after J.D.B.132 The way that juveniles think, reason, and
relate to authority figures implies that a youth might not
understand nor appreciate his right to walk away from an officer
and therefore be subject to police questioning during a
“consensual encounter.”133 Thus, placed in stressful situations,
young people are more deferential to authority.134 For most
129

Whether an encounter constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes rests on the level of restraint exercised by the police. See United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
130
See Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct 1319, 1326 (1983); Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
131
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
132
See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (“[A] reasonable child subjected to
police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable
adult would feel free to go.”).
133
See e.g. People v. Lopez, 892 N.E.2d 1047, 1061 (Ill. 2008) (“When
assessing whether a juvenile was seized for purposes of the fourth
amendment, [it is appropriate to] . . . modify the reasonable person standard
to consider whether a reasonable juvenile would have thought that his
freedom of movement was restricted.”); see also Lourdes M. Rosado, Minors
and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status Should Invoke Different
Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
794 (1996).
134
See Barry Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study
of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 230 (2006)
(citing Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on
Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992)) (noting that children
are socialized to obey authority figures); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 333–63 (2003)
(psychosocial characteristics such as compliance with authority, risk
appraisal, and future orientation were found to influence adolescents’ decision
making in three different legal scenarios: confessing to police, accepting a
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people, young or old, questioning by police of suspected
criminal activity is stressful. Juveniles often feel they must
comply with requests and answer truthfully.135 While adults may
be more likely to invoke their right to walk away when it would
be in their self-interest, the cognitive, emotional, and social
development of a youth may well render a different response.
Failure to consider the “youth status” of the defendant illustrates
the gap in Fourth Amendment protection. Logically, it follows
from J.D.B. that an assessment of whether a reasonable person
in the defendant’s position would have felt free to leave must
136
include age as a relevant factor.
The unique needs of children raise a conundrum for many
lawyers who represent children.137 The Court noted in Graham
plea agreement, and disclosing to an attorney); Marty Beyer, Immaturity,
Culpability & Competence of Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST.
MAG., Summer 2000, at 26, 29 (arguing that because of their immature
thought processes, juveniles do not believe they have a choice when talking
to the police).
135
See Beyer, supra note 134, at 29.
136
Some states and federal courts do include age in the Terry
determination. See e.g., United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 n.7
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Of course age, gender, education and intelligence may be
relevant in any particular case, to the extent they are objectively
apparent.”). In a 1983 claim where a sixteen-year-old girl claimed wrongful
seizure, the Tenth Circuit took age into account by viewing her “encounter
through the eyes of a reasonable sixteen-year-old.” Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d
1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005). Two concurring judges in In re J.M. concluded
“that the majority’s application of the hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ test
for adults to a child is misconceived.” In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 504 (D.C.
1992). Even before J.D.B., the concurring justices considered characteristics
of youth when they noted that a reasonable child test would ensure
that “young citizens are not denied constitutional protection by reason of their
age and immaturity.” Id. at 506. J.D.B. made it clear that consideration of a
suspect’s age would not require “anticipating the idiosyncrasies” or the
subjective state of mind of the person being interrogated by police. J.D.B.,
131 S. Ct. at 2402.
137
See Laura Cohen & Randi Mandelbaum, Kids Will Be Kids: Creating
a Framework for Interviewing and Counseling Adolescent Clients, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 357, 358 (2006) (“The challenge for lawyers who represent young
people age twelve and over is clear: Can we create a paradigm for legal
interviewing and counseling that affords these clients the autonomy that the
ethical rules—and, one might argue, moral obligations—demand, but, at the
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that the features that distinguish juveniles from adults make them
less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to
aid in their defense.”138 The Roper, Graham, J.D.B. trilogy
provides support for tailoring the attorney-client relationship to
the unique needs of juvenile clients. A juvenile’s lack of
experience and judgment may create a greater risk of not
understanding the role of defense counsel, the long-term
consequences of their legal decisions, or the concept of the
attorney-client privilege. 139 It may take more time to educate the
juvenile client on his options and subsequently have the client
140
direct the goals of representation. Children may require more
time building a rapport and trust with their attorney than an
adult client in the same situation. 141 In order to help young
clients understand their choices and the legal process, lawyers
need to simplify concepts and have more frequent discussions
with clients that reinforce the long term consequences of their
decisions.
Roper and Graham only considered juvenile distinctions
under the Eighth Amendment. J.D.B. applied that same line of
reasoning to the Miranda custody analysis. Together, these cases
have far-reaching implications on how youth status can be
applied in substantive and procedural criminal jurisprudence.
For instance, every area of criminal law that uses a “reasonable
same time, compensates for their immature decision-making abilities?”
(citations omitted)).
138
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). Characteristics
attributable to children such as impetuous decision making and mistrust of
authority figures pose obstacles to the attorney-client relationship. See id.
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person” standard creates an opportunity for the establishment of
a “reasonable child” standard.142 Likewise, when a police officer
attains tangible evidence via a consent search, consideration for
whether the child legally consented should be determined
according to whether a “reasonable child” would have greater
difficulty knowingly and voluntarily consenting to a search. The
next big set of questions addresses the degree to which courts
approach the application of criminal procedure and criminal law
differently as applied to the age of the accused.
CONCLUSION
J.D.B. v. North Carolina is the first time the Court
addressed the relevance of age in determining custody for
Miranda purposes. Much rests on the result. The decision has
the potential to reinvigorate the spirit of In re Gault.143 The
intent of the Court in Gault was to provide greater due process
protections for youth.144 The decision paved the way for
procedural justice for juveniles in the delinquency context.145 For
its part, J.D.B. has the potential to bring due process rights for
juveniles into the twenty-first century by ensuring consideration
of youth in the investigation and adjudication phases of the
prosecution of a juvenile.
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